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Hudson v. Palmer: Return to the "Hands-
Off" Approach to Prisoners' Rights?
I. Introduction
In Hudson v. Palmer,' a divided Supreme Court decided for
the first time that the fourth amendment's protection is unavail-
able to prisoners in their prison cells.2 The Court held that soci-
ety is not prepared to recognize that a prisoner has any legiti-
mate expectation of privacy in his prison cell and, accordingly,
the constitutional proscription against unreasonable searches
and seizures is inapplicable in that context.' In so holding, the
Court gave great weight to the paramount interest in prison se-
curity, maintaining that recognition of privacy rights for prison-
ers simply cannot be reconciled with the concept of incarcera-
tion, and the needs and objectives of penal institutions.4
Part II of this Note reviews the development of fourth
amendment analysis in the context of prison search and seizure
cases. Part III presents the facts, procedural history, and the
opinion of the Supreme Court in Hudson v. Palmer. Part IV
analyzes the majority and dissenting opinions of the Court in
Palmer, giving particular attention to the divergent views of le-
gitimate prisoner rights and the distinction between privacy and
possessory interests protected by the fourth amendment. Part V
1. 104 S. Ct. 3194 (1984).
2. The circuit courts addressed this issue prior to Palmer. Initially, the majority of
circuit courts held that prisoners retain at least some remnants of fourth amendment
rights consistent with the legitimate demands on prison security. E.g., United States v.
Hinckley, 672 F.2d 115 (D.C. Cir. 1982); United States v. Lilly, 576 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir.
1978). In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), the Supreme Court held that prison-
ers retain those constitutional rights not inconsistent with prison security needs. Prior to
Wolff, the Second and Ninth Circuits held that the fourth amendment has no applica-
tion in a prison cell. It is now the law in both of these circuits that the fourth amend-
ment protects prisoners against unreasonable searches and seizures. For a more extensive
discussion of the lower court decisions, see infra notes 26-51 and accompanying text. See
also Palmer, 104 S. Ct. at 3212 n.19 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
3. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. at 3200.
4. Id.
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concludes that the Court's holding is unjustified and unnecessa-
rily broad, placing unfettered discretion in the hands of those
whom the fourth amendment was historically meant to restrict.5
II. Background
Although few prison search and seizure cases have been de-
cided by the Supreme Court,6 the nature of the fourth amend-
ment inquiry in that context can be defined by examining the
standards enunciated in Katz v. United States7 and in the
Court's most recent pronouncement in United States v. Jacob-
sen.8 Katz and its progeny established that the fourth amend-
ment's prohibition against unreasonable searches or seizures ap-
plies when the person seeking to invoke its protection has
exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy that society is will-
ing to recognize as reasonable.10 This analysis was expanded in
Jacobsen with the Court's recognition that the fourth amend-
ment protects two distinct interests - a privacy interest and a
possessory interest." A constitutionally prohibited search occurs
when an expectation of privacy that society is willing to recog-
nize as reasonable is infringed through government action. 12 A
seizure of property occurs when, through official conduct, there
is some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory
interest in that property."3 The claims of prison inmates alleging
5. See, e.g., United States v. Lilly, 576 F.2d at 1244 (maintaining that prisioners
may retain some fourth amendment rights without posing a threat to security).
6. These cases are Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979); Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S.
139 (1962); and Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S 15 (1919). For a discussion of Stroud
and Lanza, see infra notes 14-22 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Wolfish, see
infra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
7. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
8. 104 S. Ct. 1652 (1984).
9. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
10. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
11. United States v. Jacobsen, 104 S. Ct. at 1656.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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unconstitutional official conduct have prompted a refinement of
fourth amendment analysis, focusing the inquiry on the legiti-
macy of a prisoner's claim of a constitutionally protected inter-
est and on the difference between his separate privacy and pos-
sessory interests.
There were only two prison search and seizure cases decided
by the Supreme Court prior to Katz, Stroud v. United States1 4
and Lanza v. New York.' 5 It is significant that neither case
squarely confronts the threshold question of whether the fourth
amendment applies at all in a jail cell. Together, however, they
illustrate the tension in fourth amendment analysis between
evaluating each individual case for the existence of a protectable
interest and entirely denying fourth amendment protection in a
prison context pursuant to a per se rule.
In Stroud, certain letters written by a prisoner were inter-
cepted, examined, and turned over to the warden who, in turn,
furnished them to the District Attorney. The prisoner sought to
suppress the use of the letters when they were later offered as
evidence against him in a criminal case. 6 The Court rejected his
claim, finding that no constitutional violation had occurred.17
Assuming that the fourth amendment offered some protection to
prisoners, the Court focused on whether the seizure was reasona-
ble. Since the letters came into the possession of the peniten-
tiary officials under established practice, reasonably designed to
promote the discipline of the institution, there was no violation
of the prisoner's rights.' 8
Lanza involved a defendant who had been convicted of con-
tempt for refusing to answer questions before a legislative com-
mittee. 9 The defendant claimed that the questions were based
on an in-jail conversation between him and his brother that had
been illegally intercepted and recorded by state officials. Al-
though the Court upheld the conviction on grounds that were
unrelated to the fourth amendment issue,20 it stated in dicta:
14. 251 U.S. 15 (1919).
15. 370 U.S. 139 (1962).
16. Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. at 21.
17. Id. at 21-22.
18. Id.
19. Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. at 140.
20. Id. at 145-46. At least two of these questions that the committee asked the de-
19851
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But to say that a public jail is the equivalent of a man's "house"
or that it is a place where he can claim constitutional immunity
from search or seizure of his person, his papers, or his effects, is
at best a novel argument . . . . [W]ithout attempting either to
define or to predict the ultimate scope of Fourth Amendment
protection, it is obvious that a jail shares none of the attributes of
privacy of a home, an automobile, an office, or a hotel room. In
prison, official surveillance has traditionally been the order of the
day.21
This view reflected the notion that the fourth amendment pro-
vided constitutional protection for specific places. Lanza sug-
gests that a jail, as a place, might have diminished fourth
amendment protection. The majority of circuit court decisions in
later cases, however, recognized that Katz mandated a departure
from the constitutionally protected area doctrine and that the
dicta in Lanza should be ignored.22
Although Katz was not a prison search and seizure case, it
established the fourth amendment analysis used in subsequent
cases involving inmate challenges of official misconduct.23 To in-
voke the fourth amendment, a prisoner must demonstrate a sub-
jective expectation of privacy that society is willing to recognize
as reasonable. 2 Katz also established that the fourth amend-
ment protects people not places,2 5 shifting the inquiry away
from determining whether the challenged conduct occurred in a
constitutionally protected place to whether the person's consti-
tutional rights had been violated.
Following Lanza and Katz, the circuits were called upon
more frequently to address the issue of searches and seizures in
the prison context. The circuit courts adopted the Katz reasona-
ble expectation of privacy test, the majority concluding that,
consistent with the security needs of institutions, prisoners re-
fendant were not related in any way to the intercepted conversation.
21. Id. at 143.
22. See, e.g., Lyon v. Farrier, 727 F.2d 766, 769 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 140
(1984); United States v. Hinckley, 672 F.2d at 128-32; United States v. Lilly, 576 F.2d at
1245-46; United States v. Ready, 574 F.2d 1009, 1013-14 (10th Cir. 1978).
23. See, e.g., United States v. Hinckley, 672 F.2d at 130-31; Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
at 556-57; United States v. Savage, 482 F.2d 1371, 1372-73 (9th Cir. 1973).
24. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
25. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 351.
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tain at least some remnants of fourth amendment protection. 6
The Second and Ninth Circuits in these early cases, however,
held that the fourth amendment had no application in a prison
cell.27 After the Supreme Court decided Wolff v. McDonnell,2 s
the Second and Ninth Circuits reversed their positions and held
that prisoners retain fourth amendment protection against
searches and seizures that are not justified by the institutional
needs of prisons.29 Wolff was a class action brought by an inmate
of a Nebraska prison. He alleged that certain disciplinary pro-
ceedings offended due process, that the inmate legal assistance
program did not meet constitutional standards, and that the
mail inspection regulations governing mail between inmates and
their attorneys were unduly restrictive.30 The Supreme Court
held that, although a prisoner's rights are diminished by the
"needs and exigencies of the institutional environment,""1 he is
not "wholly stripped of constitutional protections when he is im-
prisoned for crime."32 The Court maintained that certain mini-
mal due process requirements must be observed in disciplinary
proceedings. 3 Wolff decided that due process did not require
the right to counsel during prison disciplinary hearings,34 and
that certain restrictions on an inmate's incoming mail were legit-
imate to protect against receipt of contraband.3 5 In so holding,
the Supreme Court in Wolff established a more flexible ap-
proach to prisoners' rights and mandated an "accommodation
26. See supra note 2.
27. See, e.g., United States v. Hitchcock, 467 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
410 U.S. 916 (1978); Christman v. Skinner, 468 F.2d 723 (2d Cir. 1972).
28. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
29. See, e.g., Hodges v. Stanley, 712 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1983); Hansen v. May, 502 F.2d
728 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Savage, 482 F.2d 1371 (9th Cir. 1973). See also
Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 3212 n.19 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part).
30. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 543.
31. Id. at 555.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 563-69. The Court held that due process requires that prisoners are enti-
tled to notice, to call witnesses, and to present documentary evidence. Prisoners do not
retain the right to confront or to cross-examine witnesses. Id.
34. Id. at 569-70. The Court opined that allowance of counsel would diminish the
utility of prison disciplinary proceedings by, among other things, causing delay. In dic-
tum, the Court suggested that an illiterate inmate, or one facing complex issues, should
be able to seek the assistance of a fellow inmate or staff designate in lieu of counsel. Id.
35. Id. at 576-77.
1985]
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between institutional needs and objectives and the provisions of
the Constitution that are of general application. ' 36 Wolff is uni-
versally cited as the Court's repudiation of a "hands-off" ap-
proach which had required absolute deference to prison admin-
istration. It mandated examination of prisoners' rights on a case
by case basis. 37
Repudiation of the "hands-off" approach allowed the cir-
cuits to more fully examine the justifications for application of
the fourth amendment in the prison context. Several circuits,
considering whether the fourth amendment afforded protection
to prisoners, expressly limited the discretion customarily ac-
corded prison officials. Their analysis incorporated a considera-
tion of the history and purpose underlying the fourth amend-
ment, focusing on the recognition of human dignity inherent in
its protections. Three important cases are Bonner v. Coughlin,3
United States v. Lilly,39 and United States v. Hinckley."°
In Bonner, an inmate alleged that the loss of his trial tran-
script during a "shakedown search" violated the fourth amend-
ment.' Citing Wolff, the Seventh Circuit held that "respect for
the dignity of the individual ' 42 requires that an inmate retain
fourth amendment protection 43 because surrender of privacy in
prison is not total. The court held that the inmate had stated a
fourth amendment claim that required a trial on the merits."
Lilly involved two inmates in a federal prison who challenged
the reasonableness of a body cavity search to which they were
subjected after unsupervised absences from the prison. The
court maintained that the history and purpose of the fourth
amendment required recognition that prisoners retain at least
36. Id. at 556.
37. See J. WESLEY HALL, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 15:3 n.20 (1982). See also Palmer,
104 S. Ct. at 3212 n.19 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
38. 517 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1975).
39. 576 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir. 1978).
40. 672 F.2d 115 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
41. Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d at 1312. The inmate also claimed the loss of the
transcript deprived him of his property without due process and that the defendants had
interfered with his access to the courts in violation of the sixth and fourteenth amend-
ments. Id.
42. Id. at 1316.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1317.
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some degree of fourth amendment protection. The fourth
amendment ensured abolition of the general warrants that had
given government agents "unfettered discretion" and with which
the Framers were so deeply concerned. 5 Because denial of all
fourth amendment protection would potentially "subject [a pris-
oner] to any form of search and seizure, no matter how abusive
or intrusive, '46 the Fifth Circuit required that the government
show the searches and seizures to which prisoners were sub-
jected "be reasonable under all the facts and circumstances in
which they [were] performed." 7
In Hinckley, the District of Columbia Circuit was called
upon to decide whether an inmate's fourth amendment rights
were infringed when prison guards seized a handwritten docu-
ment from his cell.8 Announcing that the fourth amendment
did afford protection in a prison cell, the court emphasized the
purpose of the fourth amendment and concluded that "the pre-
eminent value underlying the fourth amendment, the right to
freedom from arbitrary interference with privacy,"4 9 compelled
recognition of a prisoner's right to be free of unreasonable
searches and seizures. The court stated that the wide-ranging
deference customarily accorded prison officials must "be cor-
ralled by the fourth amendment's prohibition of arbitrary inva-
sions of privacy." 50 Accordingly, the court held that a serious in-
vasion of Hinckley's right to privacy occurred when prison
officials, unrestrained by prison rules or by instructions from
their superiors, seized and read his personal papers.5 "
In 1979, five years after Wolff, the Supreme Court decided
Bell v. Wolfish.52 Wolfish was a class action by pretrial detainees
to challenge, inter alia, unannounced searches of inmate living
areas and visual body cavity searches.5 3 The Court, once again,
45. United States v. Lilly, 576 F.2d at 1244.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. United States v. Hinckley, 672 F.2d at 126.
49. Id. at 129.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 131-32.
52. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
53. Id. at 527. Visual body cavity examinations were conducted with regard to the
pretrial detainees following visits during which the detainees had contact with visitors
for the purpose of discovering contraband material (weapons or drugs).
1985]
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did not expressly decide whether the detainees54 actually had a
reasonable expectation of privacy worthy of fourth amendment
protection. Wolfish, however, expanded the Court's analysis of
the reasonableness of a particular search, identifying the com-
peting interests and factors that must be weighed. The court
must balance the need for the particular search against the inva-
sion of personal rights entailed in the search. Wolfish requires
that a court consider the scope of a particular intrusion, the
manner in which it was executed, the justification for initiating
it, and the place in which it was conducted. 5 Applying this test
of reasonableness, Wolfish rejected the detainees' challenge, con-
cluding that the significant security interests of the penal insti-
tution outweighed the privacy interests of the inmates. The in-
stitutional need to maintain security justified the unannounced
searches of living quarters and the body cavity inspections.5
In the recent case of United States v. Jacobsen,57 the Su-
preme Court clearly distinguished two distinct interests pro-
tected by the fourth amendment. Constitutional protection is
provided against unreasonable infringement of an individual's
legitimate privacy and possessory interests.5 8 In Jacobsen, em-
54. Because detainees have neither been tried nor convicted, due process issues are
raised with regard to whether the practice in question amounts to "punishment." These
considerations are, of course, not raised with regard to convicted prisoners. For a discus-
sion of judicial review of practices affecting pretrial detainees, see The Supreme Court,
1983 Term, 98 HARV. L. REV. 151, 153 n.14 (1984).
55. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 559.
56. Id. at 560. Because the Court was considering the rights of pretrial detainees in
Wolfish, it was required to evaluate whether the search rules constituted punishment in
violation of the detainees' due process rights. Id. at 560-61. In this context, due process
requires that the practices in question be "rationally related to a legitimate nonpunitive
governmental purpose" and that they not "appear excessive in relation to that purpose."
Id. at 561. Because the practices in question were reasonable responses to legitimate
security concerns, the Court found no due process violation. Id.
57. 104 S. Ct. 1652 (1984).
58. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text. In several cases prior to Jacob-
sen, the Supreme Court had recognized that "searches" and "seizures" were separable,
protected events under the fourth amendment. See Texas v. Brown, 103 S. Ct. 1535,
1536 (1983) ("[t]he [Fourth] Amendment protects two different interests of the citi-
zen - the interest in retaining possession of property and the interest in maintaining
personal privacy."); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13 n.8 (1977) ("Though
surely a substantial infringement of respondents' use and possession, the seizure did not
diminish respondents' legitimate expectation that the footlocker's contents would remain
private."); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906) ("a seizure contemplates a forcible
disposition of the owner").
[Vol. 5:781
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ployees of Federal Express, pursuant to a policy regarding insur-
ance claims, examined a damaged package and found zip-lock
bags containing white powder. Federal agents were notified.
They removed the bags, opened them, and tested the powder
which was later identified as cocaine.59 Even though the Court
found no reasonable expectation of privacy and, thus, no
"search" within the meaning of the fourth amendment, it deter-
mined that a "seizure" had occurred. ° Jacobsen observed that,
while the definition of an unconstitutional seizure of property
had not been thoroughly discussed in earlier Supreme Court
cases, it follows logically from the Court's view that seizure of a
person occurs when there has been meaningful interference with
his freedom of movement.6 ' Thus, a meaningful interference
with an individual's possessory interest in property will also con-
stitute a seizure. On the facts of Jacobsen, a seizure of property
took place when law enforcement agents took complete domin-
ion and control of the defendant's property. 2
Having found that a seizure occurred, Jacobsen evaluated
whether it was reasonable under the fourth amendment. A
seizure lawful at its inception can, nevertheless, violate the
In Jacobsen, the Court recognized that, even though its analysis was a new one, the
concept flowed from the separable fourth amendment "seizure" of a person - "the
meaningful interference, however brief, with an individual's freedom of movement."
United States v. Jacobsen, 104 S. Ct. at 1656 n.5. See, e.g., Michigan v. Summers, 452
U.S. 692, 696 (1981); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50 (1979); United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16, 19 n.16 (1968). In Palmer,
the Supreme Court impliedly adopted the Jacobsen two-prong test by addressing, in a
footnote, the seizure of Palmer's property as a distict violation. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. at
3201 n.8. Justice Stevens expressly adopted the Jacobsen test in his part concurrence,
part dissent. Id. at 3209 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In addi-
tion, several other cases have adopted the Jacobsen rationale. See, e.g., Segura v. United
States, 104 S. Ct. 3380 (1984); United States v. Karo, 104 S. Ct. 3296 (1984); United
States v. Morgan, 744 F.2d 1215 (6th Cir. 1984); Garmon v. Foust, 741 F.2d 1069 (8th
Cir. 1984); United States v. Lewis, 738 F.2d 916 (8th Cir. 1984); United States v. Beale,
736 F.2d 1289 (9th Cir. 1984).
Thus, although Jacobsen provides a "new" analysis in the sense that it enunciates
previous intimations from the Supreme Court, it should not be read as a complete depar-
ture from long-standing fourth amendment analysis. It should be read as requiring addi-
tional inquiry when the search is separable from the seizure, but not in an overly techni-
cal sense that obscures the inherent protections of the fourth amendment.
59. United States v. Jacobsen, 104 S. Ct. at 1655.
60. Id. at 1660.
61. Id. at 1656 n.5. See supra note 58.
62. United States v. Jacobsen, 104 S. Ct. at 1660.
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fourth amehdment because it is executed in a manner that un-
reasonably infringes constitutionally protected possessory inter-
ests.6 s A seizure lawful at the outset may become unreasonable
because its length "unduly intrude[s] upon constitutionally pro-
tected interests." '64 The destruction of defendant's property, be-
cause it converts a temporary deprivation of possessory interests
into a permanent one, can also transform an initially lawful
seizure into one that violates the fourth amendment.15 In Jacob-
sen, the Court considered all of these factors. The Court bal-
anced the importance of the governmental interest justifying the
intrusion against the individual's fourth amendment interests.
Because it was apparent that the package contained contraband,
the Court concluded that the agents' seizure of the bags was
based on probable cause and was, therefore, reasonable. 6 On
balance, the further intrusion occasioned by the field test was
supported by substantial law enforcement interests which out-
weighed the de minimis impact on a protected property
interest.6 7
Katz, Wolfish, and Jacobsen provide a clear framework for
the court in analyzing whether the fourth amendment is applica-
ble in a prison context. If the court finds that a prisoner has a
reasonable expectation of privacy, it must then balance the need
for the search against the prisoner's privacy interests. If there
has been only a search, the inquiry ends. But, if there has also
been a seizure of property, Jacobsen provides the criteria a
court must use to determine whether the seizure was reasonable.
Additionally, Lilly and Hinckley provide valuable analysis of the
history and purpose of the fourth amendment, recognizing that
the competing interests of security and privacy can be accommo-
dated through a case by case evaluation of fourth amendment
claims.
63. Id. at 1662.
64. Id. at 1662 n.5 (quoting United States v. Place, 103 S. Ct. 2637 (1983)).
65. Id. at 1662.
66. Id.
67. Id at 1663.
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III. The Decision: Hudson v. Palmer
A. Facts and Procedural History
On September 16, 1981, defendant Ted S. Hudson, an of-
ficer at Bland Correctional Center, conducted a "shakedown"
search of inmate Russel T. Palmer's locker. During the search,
Hudson discovered a ripped pillowcase in a trashcan in plain-
tiff's cell. Charges were filed against Palmer under the prison
disciplinary procedures for destroying state property. After a
hearing, Palmer was found guilty and ordered to make restitu-
tion for the cost of the pillowcase. In addition, a written repri-
mand was entered on his prison record. 8 Palmer subsequently
brought a pro se action against Hudson under 42 U.S.C. Section
1983.69 Palmer alleged that Hudson conducted the shakedown of
his cell, that Hudson brought a false charge against him solely to
harass him, and that Hudson intentionally destroyed Palmer's
non-contraband property70 in violation of the fourteenth
amendment. 71
B. The Lower Court Opinions
The district court granted summary judgment in defen-
dant's favor for failure to state a cognizable claim under section
1983. According to the district court, the alleged destruction of
property for purposes of harassment, even if intentional, was not
a constitutional violation. Palmer's property had not been taken
without due process of law in violation of the fourteenth amend-
ment because he had adequate state tort remedies and the har-
68. Palmer v. Hudson, No. 81-0290-A (W.D. Va. Nov. 17, 1981), reproduced in Joint
Appendix to Petition for Certiorari to the Fourth Circuit at 27, Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S.
Ct. 3194 (1984) (No. 82-6695).
69. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
70. The property consisted of legal materials, letters, and other personalty. Hudson
v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 3208 n.3 (1984).
71. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. at 3197.
1985]
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assment itself was not sufficient to constitute a constitutional
deprivation. 72 The district court considered itself powerless to
review the merits of the false charge claim."
The Fourth Circuit agreed that due process was not violated
under the facts of the case, but concluded that it was premature
to grant summary judgment for defendant on the claim that the
shakedown search was unreasonable. 7' Although Bell v. Wolf-
ish7 5 authorized irregular, unannounced shakedown searches of
prison cells, the court held that individual prisoners have a lim-
ited privacy right in their cells, protecting them from searches
conducted solely to harass or humiliate. 7 The court of appeals
announced that shakedown searches were reasonable only if con-
ducted according to an established program reasonably designed
to deter or discover contraband, or if some reasonable basis ex-
isted for a belief that the prisoner possessed contraband. Be-
cause the record reflected a factual dispute about the purpose of
the search, summary judgment was considered inappropriate
and the case was reversed in part and remanded for this
determination.77
72. Palmer v. Hudson, No. 81-0290-A (W.D. Va. Nov. 17, 1981), reproduced in Joint
Appendix to Petition for Certiorari to the Fourth Circuit, Palmer (No. 82-6695).
73. Palmer's second claim was that Hudson had brought a false charge against him
before the institution's disciplinary committee. The district court maintained that fed-
eral courts do not provide a further avenue of appeal on the merits of a prison discipli-
nary hearing. The role of the court is to ensure that procedural due process requirements
are met. Noting that Palmer was provided with notice and opportunity to be heard and
to present witnesses and evidence on his behalf at the proceeding, in deference to the
procedures of the state, the court maintained that it was powerless to review the merits
of the disciplinary hearing.
With regard to Palmer's claim of harrassment, the district court accorded great def-
erence to prison management because the courts "possess no expertise in the conduct
and management of correction institutions." Id. (quoting Finney v. Arkansas Board of
Corrections, 505 F.2d 194, 200 (8th Cir. 1974)). Maintaining that, in extreme cases of
harassment and improper treatment, a claim of cruel and unusual punishment under the
sixth [sic] amendment may be stated, the court held that Palmer's claims did not rise to
such a level and, therefore, were of no constitutional significance. In this regard the court
failed to recognize a cognizable § 1983 claim.
74. Palmer v. Hudson, 697 F.2d 1220, 1223 (1983).
75. 441 U.S. 920 (1979).
76. Palmer v. Hudson, 697 F.2d at 1225.
77. The Fourth Circuit recognized that Palmer had a limited privacy right under the
fourth amendment. Therefore, in order for the prison search to be valid, it had to serve a
legitimate security purpose. Because the district court did not determine whether the
search was motivated by the impermissible motive to harass Palmer, the Fourth Circuit
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol5/iss4/3
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether
a prisoner has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his cell en-
titling him to fourth amendment protection against unreasona-
ble searches and seizures.78
C. The Supreme Court Opinions
1. The Majority
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority in this five to
four decision, 79 framed the inquiry whether the fourth amend-
ment applies in a prison cell in terms of the two prong test
enunciated in Katz80 Concluding that a prisoner's expectation
of privacy in his prison cell is not one that society is willing to
recognize as reasonable, the Court held that the fourth amend-
ment's proscription against unreasonable searches is not applica-
ble within a prison cell.81
remanded for evidentiary determination. Palmer v. Hudson, 697 F.2d at 1224-25.
78. In addition to the fourth amendment issue, the Supreme Court considered
whether the rationale of Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1976), should extend to inten-
tional deprivations of property by state employees acting under color of state law. The
Court held that it did. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. at 3204. The implications of this decision are
just as disturbing as the Court's treatment of the fourth amendment issue.
In Parratt, an inmate of a Nebraska prison ordered a hobby kit valued at $23.50.
The hobby kit arrived at the prison but was never delivered to the inmate, Taylor. Tay-
lor brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). He alleged that the hobby kit was
lost as a result of negligence by the prison's officials and claimed that their negligence
deprived him of property without due process of law. The Supreme Court held that Tay-
lor did not state a claim for relief under § 1983. Parrat v. Taylor, 451 U.S. at 543. The
Court concluded that § 1983 actions could not be brought against prison officials for
unintentional deprivations of property because there was an adequate remedy at state
law. Id.
Palmer extends the holding of Parratt to intentional deprivations of property by
prison officials. The case effectively removes the federal courts as a protector against
inhumane conditions of incarceration. After Palmer, the state courts are the prisoner's
only effective avenue of appeal when the prisoner is deprived of his property. The court
has once again endorsed the "hands-off"' attitude toward prisoners rights that prevailed
before Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
79. Chief Justice Burger delivered this majority opinion in which Justices White,
Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor joined. Justice O'Connor filed a separate concurring
opinion. Justice Stevens filed an opinion in which he concurred in the holding regarding
the fourteenth amendment issue, but dissented on the fourth amendment issue. Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun joined in Justice Stevens' opinion.
80. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. at 3199. For a discussion of the Katz two-prong test, see
supra notes 7-14 and accompanying text.
81. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. at 3200.
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The Court gave great weight to statistics of violent crime in
the nation's prisons, concluding that prisoners have demon-
strated an inability to control and conform their behavior to so-
ciety's standards by normal self-restraint. Prisons must be con-
ducted to assure the safety of prison personnel, of visitors, and
of the inmates themselves. A sanitary prison environment must
also be maintained.82 To effectively meet these objectives, the
Court concluded that the prison officials must be able to prevent
attempts to introduce drugs, weapons, and other contraband
into the prison. They must also diligently attempt to detect es-
cape plots, involving drugs or weapons, before the schemes
materialize.8 3
Using the balancing approach of Wolff v. McDonnell8' the
Court concluded that it would be "literally impossible" to attain
these prison objectives if inmates retained a right to privacy in
their cells.8 5 Society would insist that the balance between the
prisoner's interest in privacy and society's interest in security
always tip in favor of the paramount interest in institutional se-
curity.8 6 A right to privacy, according to Chief Justice Burger, is
fundamentally incompatible with the close and continual sur-
veillance of inmates and their cells required to ensure internal
order and security.8 7 The majority also decided that it need not
address Palmer's claim that he had a constitutional right to be
protected from searches conducted solely to harass. The Court
82. The Chief Justice cited to CORRECTIONS COMPENDIUM, PRISION VIOLENCE (Mar.
1983), for the following statistics: during 1981 and the first half of the 1982, there were
over 120 prisoners murdered by fellow inmates in state and federal prisons; a "number
of" prison personnel were murdered by prisoners during this period; over 29 riots or
"similar disturbances" were reported; there were over 125 suicides in these institutions.
Palmer, 104 S. Ct. at 3200.
In federal prisons, Chief Justice Burger maintained, "informal statistics" from the
U.S. Bureau of Prisons for 1983 reveal that there were 11 inmate homicides, 359 inmate
assaults on prison staff, and 10 suicides. In that system, during 1981 and 1982, over 750
inmate assaults on other inmates occurred, along with over 570 inmate assaults on prison
personnel. Id.
83. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. at 3200.
84. 418 U.S. 539 (1974). In Wolff, the Court stated: "there must be a mutual accom-
modation between institutional needs and objectives and the provisions of the Constitu-
tion that are of general application." Id. at 556.
85. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. at 3200.
86. Id at 3201.
87. Id.
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reasoned that asserting a constitutional right against unreasona-
ble searches and seizures in a prison cell assumes an answer to
the threshold question - whether there is a legitimate expec-
tation of privacy in a prison cell at all. Since the majority had
already determined that the fourth amendment does not apply
to prison cells, it did not have to reach a claim alleging an un-
reasonable search or seizure.88 In any event, says the Court, the
proper remedies for calculated harassment are the eighth
amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment
and state tort and common law redress for the destruction of
property.89
2. Concurrence
In a separate concurrence, Justice O'Connor agreed with the
majority that "the Government's compelling interest in prison
safety, together with the necessarily ad hoc judgments required
of prison officials, make prison cell searches and seizures appro-
priate for categorical treatment." 90 Because Justice O'Connor
saw the fact of arrest and incarceration as abating all fourth
amendment interests of a prisoner, she considered all cell
searches and seizures as per se reasonable.9' Further, although
Justice O'Connor recognized that, under Jacobsen, the fourth
amendment protects possessory interests in addition to privacy
interests, she did not consider the alleged destruction of
Palmer's property to be redressable under the fourth amend-
ment. Instead, Justice O'Connor stressed that deprivations of
property may be redressed by invoking the protection of the due
process and the takings clauses of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments. But, because Palmer had not availed himself of
state tort and common law remedies nor proven them inade-
quate, she concluded that his constitutional claims under these
clauses were not ripe and that summary judgment for Hudson
had been proper.2"
88. Id. at 3202.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 3206 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 3206-07.
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3. The Dissent
Justice Stevens, dissenting,"3 agreed that Palmer's com-
plaint did not successfully allege a constitutional violation of his
right to procedural due process. 4 Nevertheless, he took issue
with the majority view that society is unwilling to recognize even
a limited privacy right for prisoners in their prison cells.95 Jus-
tice Stevens opined that society is willing to recognize that a
prisoner has at least a limited privacy right in his papers or ef-
fects. Although this has little value compared with the privacy
right that prevails in a free society, it can have a great impact on
the rehabilitation goal of penal institutions.9 A prisoner's per-
sonal possessions that may include photographs, books, training
materials and the like, may enable him "to maintain contact
with some part of his past and an eye to the possibility of a
better future. '97 Protecting these few possessions and the pris-
oner's slight residuum of privacy against unreasonable invasions
by prison guards will further the important goal of
rehabilitation.9
The dissent flatly rejected the proposition that society de-
nies prisoners all fourth amendment protection in their prison
cells.9 9 Justice Stevens' constitutional analysis is predicated on a
recognition that the fourth amendment, prohibiting unreasona-
ble searches and seizures, protects two distinct interests, a pri-
vacy interest and a possessory interest. " 'A search occurs when
an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider
reasonable is infringed. A seizure of property occurs when there
is some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory
93. For purposes of this Note, "dissent" refers to that portion of Justice Stevens'
opinion that discusses the fourth amendment issue.
94. Id. at 3208 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Ste-
vens limited his concurrence to the application of Parratt to the facts of the case. He did
not read the holding of the case to apply to conduct "that violates a substantive consti-
tutional right" nor to cases where it is alleged that "the established prison procedures
themselves create an unreasonable risk that prisoners will be unjustifiably deprived of
their property." Id. at 3208 n.4.
95. Id. at 3208.
96. Id. at 3208, 3214.
97. Id. at 3208.
98. Id. at 3214.
99. Id. at 3209.
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interests in that property.' "100 For purposes of this case, says
the dissent, even if it is assumed that the prisoner had no expec-
tation of privacy in most of his property in question,0 1 he ade-
quately alleged an unreasonable seizure cognizable under the
fourth amendment. 10 2
According to the dissent, prison security does not preclude
prisoners from having constitutionally protected possessory in-
terests. They may, as a matter of state law and prison regula-
tions, have a legal right to possess certain items of property. 0
3
Furthermore, these possessory interests are recognized by virtue
of the constitutional protections afforded under the due process
clause,0 4 and the first, 105 the eighth 6 and the fourteenth
amendments. 107
Having established that Palmer's complaint adequately al-
leged a fourth amendment seizure, the dissent balanced his con-
stitutionally protected possessory interest with the penological
justification for the challenged conduct determining that the
seizure was unreasonable. Justice Stevens argued that the legal
possession of non-contraband property which poses no security
threat is an interest that society is willing to recognize as reason-
able. He found evidence of society's view: 1) in the unanimous
decisions of federal court judges who have consistently recog-
nized that the fourth amendment applies in a prison cell and 2)
100. Id. (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 1656 (1984) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)) (emphasis added).
101. Id. The dissent assumed that the majority's holding about most of Palmer's
privacy interests is correct but cautions that this is not an endorsement of a bright line
test denying prisoners any expectation of privacy in their property. The dissent noted at
least two situations in which an expectation of privacy must be recognized: 1) minimum
security prisons in which there are no real security threats and 2) a prisoner's mail that
has already been cleared through the prison censorship procedures. Id. at 3209 n.5.
102. Id. at 3209.
103. Id. at 3210, 3212.
104. Id. at 3211. The dissent argued that the majority impliedly recognized Palmer's
legitimate claim of entitlement to the property at issue when it held that it was property
within the meaning of the due process clause. Id. at 3210.
105. Id. at 3211. Justice Stevens argued that the first amendment protects an in-
mate's right to send and receive mail.
106. Id. The eighth amendment precludes a view that a prisoner has no protection
against arbitrary or malicious seizure and distribution of "a letter from his wife, or a
picture of his baby."
107. Id. The fourteenth amendment protects a prisoner's right to possess legal
materials in order to afford the constitutional right of access to the courts.
1985]
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in the opinions of commentators who suggest that the objectives
of incarceration are furthered by respect for a prisoner's legiti-
mate possessory interest.108 In the last analysis, however, the
dissent concludes that "[o]nce it is agreed that random searches
of a prisoner's cell are reasonable to ensure that the cell contains
no contraband, there can be no need for seizure and destruction
of non-contraband items found during such searches."10 A per
se denial of fourth amendment protection for a prisoner's pri-
vacy and possessory interests, under these circumstances, is, ac-
cording to Justice Stevens, to declare that prisoners are "little
more than chattels."110
IV. Analysis
In holding that the fourth amendment has no application in
a prison cell, the Supreme Court maintained that it would be
"literally impossible to accomplish the [security goals of an in-
stitution] if inmates retained a right of privacy in their cells." '
The Court was satisfied that society would be unwilling to recog-
nize any expectation of privacy as reasonable because, on bal-
ance, a prisoner's interest in privacy must always yield to the
paramount governmental interest in institutional security. 2
Although the Court provided ample statistics on violence in
prisons1 that support the need for institutional security, it
failed, when it adopted a bright-line rule, 114 to seek expressions
108. Id. at 3212-13.
109. Id. at 3215.
110. Id.
111. Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 3200 (1984).
112. Id. at 3201. See supra notes 82-89 and accompanying text.
113. For a discussion of statistics on violence, see supra note 82.
114. Although the language in Palmer is very broad in its disregard of fourth
amendment rights in prison, the decision's impact on pretrial detainees and on prisoner's
rights regarding body cavity searches is unclear. Each of these categories has, in the past,
been treated with somewhat more sensitivity by the Court, and different considerations
arise in each situation. In Wolfish, the Court took care that the practice in question did
not constitute punishment of the detainees, in light of the presumption of innocence of
these yet untried detainees. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 560-62 (1979). However, the
Court held that competing security interests of the "holding" institution outweighed the
prisoners' privacy interests. Thus, the Court validated the cell search rule and the body
cavity search rule. Id. at 556-57, 558-60. Further, although the Court did not "doubt...
that on occasion a security guard may conduct a [body cavity] search in an obtrusive
fashion," it maintained that it would not condone such abuse. Id. at 560. Justice Powell
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of what society considers reasonable. Expressions of a societal
opinion supporting a right of privacy for prisoners can be found
in the circuit court opinions, in writings of legal commentators
and sociologists and in the American Bar Association's Stan-
dards Relating to the Legal Status of Prisoners.'"
Before Hudson v. Palmer, the circuit court judges were
unanimous in recognizing at least a limited privacy right for
prisoners.11 Although Justice Stevens considers it significant
that virtually every federal judge in the past decade concluded
that the fourth amendment has application in a prison cell, the
majority dismissed these circuit court opinions in a mere foot-
note.1 17 Failing to recognize the import of Wolff v. McDonnell,'"
Chief Justice Burger incorrectly viewed the circuits as being in a
state of conflict needing resolution by the Supreme Court. Prior
to Wolff, the courts had maintained a "hands-off" attitude
about official conduct involving prison administration. They felt
deference to prison officials often precluded an evaluation of
prison conditions by the courts." 9 The Supreme Court recog-
nized in Wolff that "a prisoner is not wholly stripped of consti-
tutional protections when he is imprisoned for a crime."12 It is
especially significant that judges in post-Wolff cases, having
concurred in part in the Court's opinion in Wolfish, but dissented on the body cavity
search issue, arguing that "[iln view of the serious intrusion ... occasioned by such a
search, . . . at least some level of cause, such as a reasonable suspicion, should be re-
quired to justify the anal and genital searches .... " Id. at 563 (Powell, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). Likewise, in Palmer, Justice Stevens opined that the
Court's holding did not apply to body cavity searches. See Palmer, 104 S. Ct. at 3216
n.31. Thus with regard to pretrial detainees and body cavity searches, balancing the pris-
oner's interests against the prison security interests creates confusion. It is unclear
whether the Court would accord the prisoners' interests in these situations more impor-
tance than was given to privacy interests in Palmer or whether it would consider security
interests as paramount to any other consideration in all situations. For a discussion of
Justice Stevens' cautions with regard to the brightline rule, see supra note 101.
115. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE LEGAL STATUS OF PRISONERS § 6.6 (Tent.
Draft 1977), reprinted in J. WESLEY HALL supra note 37, § 15:9 n.20.
116. See supra notes 26-51 and accompanying text.
117. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. at 3198, n.5. The Chief Justice gives no weight to Wolff v.
McDonnell, which marked the beginning of judicial review of institutional decisions.
Failing to note the decisions after Wolff, he thus considers the Second and Ninth Cir-
cuits to hold that the fourth amendment does not apply within a prison cell.
118. 418 U.S. 539 (1974). See supra notes 26-51 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 26-51 and accompanying text.
120. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. at 3212.
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been given the freedom to examine a prisoner's constitutional
protections, unanimously recognized that prisoners have at least
a diminished expectation of privacy. 121
The existence of a prisoner's diminished expectation of pri-
vacy is affirmed in the American Bar Association Standards Re-
lating to the Legal Status of Prisoners. 22 They provide only for
routine visual inspections by prison staff who do not have prior
authorization from a superior. Under these standards, the chief
executive officer is required to authorize an intrusive search of a
prisoner's living quarters or belongings. Any unauthorized intru-
sive searches of a prisoner's living quarters must be based on a
reasonable belief that the prisoner has contraband and that he
will dispose of the contraband in the interval necessary to obtain
written permission for a search. Such precautions are clearly
provided by the American Bar Association to protect a pris-
oner's privacy interests in his cell.
Concerned that deprivation of privacy has a very adverse
impact on prisoners, sociologists and legal commentators alike
have argued for the protection of a privacy right for prisoners.
According to one sociologist, 123 the security goals of an institu-
tion are actually undermined by depriving prisoners of pri-
vacy.124 Studies have shown that because "social distance is in-
strumental to as well as affirmative of personal honor, '125
prisoners who are deprived of privacy tend to isolate themselves
from those with whom they are forced into contact. This ulti-
mately leads to a repression of hostility and a disposition to-
wards the violent behavior 2 6 that Chief Justice Burger finds so
disconcerting. Thus a denial of privacy rights contributes to,
rather than alleviates, security problems. Similarly, legal com-
mentators have maintained that an inmate's ability to reform, a
concern unaddressed by the Court, is significantly diminished
without the "dignity" inherent in the privacy right accorded by
121. See Palmer, 104 S. Ct. at 3212 n.19.
122. See supra note 115.
123. Schwartz, Deprivation of Privacy as a "Functional Pre-Requisite": The Case
of the Prison, 63 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 229 (1972) (recognizing the deg-
radation of lack of privacy and arguing for such a right for prisoners).
124. See generally id.
125. Id. at 231.
126. See generally id.
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the fourth amendment. 127 For "[i]t is anomalous to provide a
prisoner with rehabilitative programs and services in an effort to
build self-respect while simultaneously subjecting him to unjus-
tified and degrading searches and seizures."128
Aware of the anomaly created by allowing all searches and
seizures of a prisoner's living quarters, and concerned about
dimunition of a prisoner's chance to rehabilitate, Justice Stevens
recognized "at least a residuum of privacy"'129 for prisoners in
their cells. For "that trivial residuum may mark the difference
between slavery and humanity" 30 insofar as it limits the "unre-
strained perusal" by prison staff of prisoners' "[p]ersonal letters,
snapshots of family members, a souvenir."'3' Justice Stevens
poses the threshold question - "[i]s the Court correct in its
perception that 'society' is not prepared to recognize any privacy
or possessory interest of a prison inmate - no matter how re-
mote the threat to prison security may be?"1 3 2 The majority's
answer is based solely on prison crime statistics. Inferences
drawn from this information, itself subject to conflicting inter-
pretations, can hardly be said to represent society's view of pris-
oners' rights in all circumstances.
Aside from determining the existence of a protected privacy
interest, United States v. Jacobsen13 3 requires an assessment of
an individual's possessory interests to complete a fourth amend-
ment analysis where "search" and "seizure" are separable
events.13 4 Although the majority in Palmer impliedly recognized
the Jacobsen analysis,' it nevertheless maintained that: "the
same [security] reasons that [led it] to conclude that the Fourth
Amendment's proscription against unreasonable searches is in-
applicable in a prison cell, apply with controlling force to
127. Giannelli & Gilligan, Prison Searches and Seizures: "Locking" the Fourth
Amendment Out of Correctional Facilities, 62 VA. L. REv. 1045, 1067-69 (1976).
128. Id. at 1069. See Palmer, 104 S. Ct. at 3214 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
129. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. at 3208 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 3208 (emphasis in original).
133. 104 S. Ct. 1652 (1984).
134. See supra notes 11-13, 58-67 and accompanying text.
135. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. at 3201 n.8.
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seizures. Prison officials must be free to seize from cells any arti-
cles which, in their view, disserve legitimate institutional inter-
ests."'3 But, the Court ignored the fact that the material at is-
sue - letters and legal materials"s7 - did not threaten any
legitimate institutional interests. As Justice Stevens points out,
Palmer's possession of these items was entirely legitimate under
both the Federal Bureau of Prisons' regulations'38 and under
Virginia law' 319 and its Department of Corrections' regulations. "'
These laws and regulations allow for the seizure of only legiti-
mate contraband property. In fact, they affirmatively mandate
that prison officials respect prisoners' possessory rights in non-
contraband personal property.'" Thus, once a search establishes
that an item is not contraband, its seizure and destruction can-
not be justified as reasonable under the fourth amendment on
security grounds. The fourth amendment's protections should
not be defaced by "a balancing process that overwhelms the in-
dividual's protection against unwarranted official intrusion by a
governmental interest said to justify the search and seizure." 142
The Court's holding in Palmer is overly broad. The bright
line rule it adopts in this case is neither warranted by the cir-
cumstances of incarceration nor justified by the Court's analysis.
Case by case adjudication has been the traditional treatment in
fourth amendment cases.143 Categorical treatment an is excep-
tion warranted in only a few instances. "4 In light of the fact that
136. Id.
137. Id. at 3208 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
138. 28 C.F.R. §§ 553.12, 553.13 (1983).
139. VA. CODE § 53.1-26 (1982).
140. Virginia Department of Corrections, Division of Adult Services, Guideline No.
411 (Sept. 16, 1983).
141. See Palmer, 104 S. Ct. at 3213-14. See also American Correctional Association,
Standards for Adult Correctional Institutions 2-4192 (2d ed. 1981); ABA Standards for
Criminal Justice 23-6.10 (2d ed. 1980); National Advisory Commission on Criminal Stan-
dards and Goals, Corrections 2.7 (1973).
142. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 570 (1976) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting) (emphasis added).
143. See Palmer, 104 S. Ct. at 3206 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 17 n.15 (1968).
144. See, e.g, United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823 (1982) (warrantless search of
an automobile authorized where police have probable cause to believe contraband is hid-
den; scope of the search is as broad as a magistrate could authorize by warrant); New
York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460-61 (1981) (a policeman may search the passenger com-
partment of an automobile where he has made a lawful custodial arrest of its occupants);
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the circuit courts found case by case adjudication workable for
the sixty-five year span between Stroud and Palmer and, that
the Court offers little justification for leaving prisoners wholly
stripped of fourth amendment protections, '45 the Court should
have recognized at least a diminished expectation of protection
under the fourth amendment.
Echoed in the circuit court cases are the concerns inherent
in the fourth amendment's protections: limiting the discretion of
individual government agents; according dignity to prisoners;
recognizing the history and purpose underlying the amendment.
In United States v. Lilly," the court maintained that "[tihe
history and purpose underlying the fourth amendment .. .re-
quire that prisoners retain at least some degree of their fourth
amendment protection.' 147 The fourth amendment was adopted
in reaction to general warrants "that gave government agents
unfettered discretion to conduct searches and to seize prop-
erty."'48 Any wholesale denial of the amendment's protections to
persons who are incarcerated subjects them to the threat of
abuse at the hands of government agents. Palmer permits the
very evil that the Framers intended to eradicate when they
drafted the fourth amendment.
Earlier circuit court cases provide a more thorough and bal-
anced appraisal of the significance of fourth amendment protec-
tions in the prison context. They emphasize that appropriate
deference to the security needs of penal institutions is protected
by testing the,reasonableness of official conduct. Lilly held that
a categorical denial of fourth amendment protection for prison
inmates is completely untenable. The Constitution, according to
Lilly, requires an evaluation of reasonableness based on the par-
ticular facts of each case."' In United States v. Hinckley, 60 the
District of Columbia Circuit held that "the preeminent value
underlying the fourth amendment, the right to freedom from ar-
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (search incident t6 lawful custodial
arrest).
145. See supra note 114.
146. 576 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir. 1978). See supra notes 39-47 and accompanying text.
147. Id. at 1244.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1245.
150. 672 F.2d 115 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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bitrary interference with privacy, must. . . be recognized. . . in
a detention context. ' 151 A like concern with the "dignity and in-
trinsic worth of every individual" was evident in Bonner v.
Coughlin'52 which required the government to show the reasona-
bleness of the seizure in that case.
In Bell v. Wolfish' 53 the Supreme Court maintained that,
"in each case," the test of reasonableness under the fourth
amendment "requires a balancing of the need for the particular
search against the invasion of personal rights that the search en-
tails. ' 154 Conversely, categorical treatment under the fourth
amendment is generally appropriate only when "those forms of
police action which involve relatively minor intrusions into pri-
vacy, occur with great frequency, and virtually defy on-the-spot
rationalization on the basis of the unique facts of the individual
case." I "5 Applying this test, prison searches are inappropriate for
the categorical treatment Justice O'Connor suggests or the
bright line rule that the Palmer majority creates. Although most
searches can be justified based on legitimate security concerns,
searches that are solely to harass or that are conducted in an
abusive manner do not constitute minor intrusions into privacy.
Nor does the seizure of property, possessed by an inmate in ac-
cordance with state law and prison regulations, constitute a mi-
nor intrusion. Additionally, prison guidelines eliminate the ne-
151. Id. at 129.
152. 517 F.2d 1311, 1316 (7th Cir. 1975) (quoting Morales v. Schmidt, 489 F.2d
1335, 1338 (7th Cir. 1973)).
153. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
154. Id. at 559 (emphasis added). The Wolfish Court did not reach the issue of
whether the detainees had an expectation of privacy, but merely assumed that they did
for purposes of their analysis in holding the room-search rule to be valid under the
fourth amendment. "The room-search rule simply facilitates the safe effective perform-
ance of the search which all concede may be conducted. The rule itself, then, does not
render the searches 'unreasonable' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." Bell
v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 557. The Court then went on to acknowledge, in a footnote, that
this challenge was not a particular instance of abuse by an individual prison guard,
which may be rendered unreasonable under the fourth amendment. Id. at 557 n.38. Be-
cause this action was a challenge to the search rule "in its entirety," in this context, the
Court accorded deference to the prison officials to "make the difficult judgments which
reconcile conflicting claims affecting the security of the institution, the welfare of the
prison staff, and the property rights of the detainees." Id. The Court thus left an avenue
open to prisoners to challenge individual instances of abuse.
155. LaFave, "Case-By-Case Adjudication" Versus "Standardized Procedures":
The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SuP. CT. REV. 127, 142-43 (1974).
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cessity for ad hoc searches or seizures while ensuring that
security considerations are not jeopardized.
Categorical treatment under the fourth amendment is usu-
ally reserved to restrict the discretion of the officer in the field
to conduct minimal intrusions on an individual's privacy and
possessory interests in circumstances that do not permit time to
balance competing interests of privacy and security.15 Palmer's
bright-line rule gives virtually unlimited discretion to officials in
a uniquely controlled situation. The facts of Palmer illustrate
that its per se rule is an unreasonable departure from traditional
fourth amendment analysis.. While a search of the inmate's cell
may have been justified for security reasons, prison officials did
not present any cogent reason for destroying the non-contra-
band personal property.
"Prisoners are truly the outcasts of society."15 As such, the
judiciary has a constitutional duty to ensure that certain funda-
mental rights are not "sacrificed to expediency. ' 15 The fourth
amendment is such a fundamental right for it "rests on the prin-
ciple that a true balance between the individual and society de-
pends on the recognition of 'the right to be let alone - the
most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civi-
lized men.' ",159 Only the fourth amendment can adequately pro-
tect the right to be let alone; state tort actions are no substitute
since they provide compensation only after the right has been
infringed. Likewise, the eighth amendment's proscription
against cruel and unusual punishment is effective only when an
abusive search and seizure rises to an extreme level. The Su-
preme Court in Palmer therefore, unjustifiably eradicates a fun-
damental constitutional protection in prisons and takes a giant
step backward to the archaic view of the prisoner as a slave of
the state. 6 ° The Court should have adopted a rule that prison-
156. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979). "A single familiar standard is es-
sential to guide police officers, who have only limited time and expertise to reflect on and
balance the social and individual interests involved in the specific circumstances they
confront." Id. at 213-14.
157. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. at 3216 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
158. Id.
159. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733, 754 (1985) (quoting Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
160. Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871) (prison inmate
19851
25
PACE LAW REVIEW
ers have a diminished expectation of privacy. Such a rule would
accommodate the legitimate security needs of penal institutions
while ensuring that the inherent dignity accorded by the fourth
amendment is not unduly and unnecessarily restricted. A dimin-
ished expectation rule would support the rehabilitation goals of
the institution by preserving the dignity that a prisoner retains
if he is allowed to possess personal items that connect him with
''some part of his past [with] an eye to the possibility of a better
future." 161 The bright-line rule only serves to undermine any
possibility for rehabilitation.
V. Conclusion
In Hudson v. Palmer,1 6 2 the Supreme Court determined
that society is unwilling to recognize as reasonable any expecta-
tion of privacy that a prisoner may subjectively exhibit in his
cell. This dramatic refusal to afford prisoners any fourth amend-
ment protection is based solely on prison crime statistics and on
the conjecture of five Justices. Although statistics provide ample
basis for a conclusion that prison is a volatile community man-
dating substantial security measures, it does not necessarily fol-
low that these interests must be always paramount to a pris-
oner's privacy interest. Under the very facts of this case, there
was no legitimate security interest for destruction of Palmer's
non contraband property; it was neither a drug nor a weapon,
nor material of the kind to pose a security risk.
The holding in Palmer, is therefore, unnecessarily broad.
Fourth amendment violations are traditionally assessed on a
case by case basis. It is neither impractical nor burdensome to
allow prisoners a limited expectation of privacy, and to deter-
mine the reasonableness of each intrusion by utilizing the Wolf-
ish balancing approach. However, under this Court's holding, all
cell searches and seizures are per se reasonable, leaving the pris-
oner to the unfettered discretion of the prison staff, with no
characterized as "a slave of the state").
161. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. at 3208.
162. 104 S. Ct. 3194 (1984).
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practical redress for the indignity of an unjustified intrusion
that infringes his legitimate privacy or possessory interests.
Patricia Yak
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